Publications

Mechanism Design with Belief-Dependent Preferences

Journal of Economic Theory , 2024

PDF Published version

Working Papers

Optimal Scaling Auctions: A Consumer Theory Deconstruction (with Allan Hernández)

R&R at Econometrica

PDF Slides
Information Without Rents: Mechanism Design Without Expected Utility (with Philipp Strack)

R&R at American Economic Review

Link to PDF
Neutral Mechanisms: On the Feasibility of Information Sharing

Job Market Paper

PDF
Information Selling under Prior Disagreement (with Nicolás Rodríguez)
PDF
Blackwell Monotonicity and Motivated Reasoning (with Inga Deimen)
PDF
On the Existence of Reduced-Form Representations
PDF
Deterministic Mechanism Design
PDF
Information Markets in Games
PDF

Work in Progress

Group Attribution Bias and Hiring Discrimination (with Inga Deimen and Ina Taneva)
Exchangeable Robust Mechanisms
The Bright Side of Bad News: Information Disclosure in the Presence of Decentralized Information Acquisition (with Alessandro Peri and Xiaobo Yu)
Optimal Scoring Auctions for Procurement: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with Allan Hernández, Zachary Breig, and Diego Carrasco)