Publications

Mechanism Design with Belief-Dependent Preferences

Journal of Economic Theory , 2024

Working Papers

Optimal Scaling Auctions: A Consumer Theory Deconstruction (with Allan Hernández)

R&R at Econometrica

Information Without Rents: Mechanism Design Without Expected Utility (with Philipp Strack)

R&R at American Economic Review

Blackwell Monotonicity and Motivated Reasoning (with Inga Deimen)

R&R at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Information Selling under Prior Disagreement (with Nicolás Rodríguez)

R&R at Journal of Economic Theory

Neutral Mechanisms: On the Feasibility of Information Sharing

Job Market Paper

On the Existence of Reduced-Form Representations
Deterministic Mechanism Design
Information Markets in Games
Scoring Contingent Auctions for Procurement: Theory and Experimental Evidence (with Zachary Breig, Diego Carrasco, and Allan Hernández-Chanto)

Work in Progress

Group Attribution Bias and Hiring Discrimination (with Inga Deimen and Ina Taneva)
Exchangeable Robust Mechanisms
The Bright Side of Bad News: Information Disclosure in the Presence of Decentralized Information Acquisition (with Alessandro Peri and Xiaobo Yu)